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Rendition and Transfer in the War
Against Terrorism: Guantafnamo and
Beyond
JOAN FITZPATRICK*
I. INTRODUCTION
The tactics of the United States in the "war against terrorism"
have stimulated new interest in the concept of "rendition." U.S.
officials use the term rendition to describe the Bush
Administration's current policies regarding the forcible interstate
transfer of suspected terrorists.' The adoption of this phrase
suggests intent to clothe these enforcement techniques with a
veneer of quasi-legal respectability, while acknowledging no
binding limits on "operational flexibility."2
States resort to rendition when either they lack extradition
relations with a requesting state, or they seek to avoid the legal
constraints of formal extradition, in the forcible transfer of
suspected persons across national boundaries. As one observer
wrote, "Nations sometimes avoid the formalities of the extradition
process by using 'quasi-formal' methods of rendition .... States
have increasingly turned to these quasi-formal methods in recent
years."3  The concept of rendition has no fixed meaning in
international law. At a minimum, it implies consent by the
* Former Jeffrey & Susan Brotman Professor of Law, University of Washington
School of Law. Professor Fitzpatrick passed away on May 14, 2003.
1. Dana Priest and Barton Gellman, U.S. Decries Abuse but Defends Interrogations:
'Stress and Distress' Tactics Used on Terrorism Suspects Held in Secret Overseas Facilities,
WASH. POST, at Al, Dec. 26, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
2. Id.
3. D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the United States:
Issues of International and Domestic Law, 23 TEX. INT'L L.J. 1, 7 (1988) (citations
omitted).
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rendering state for the transfer of the individual to the receiving
state .4
Rendition may take the form of deportation or expulsion,
functioning in intent and effect as "de facto extradition." In such
instances, the rendering state may either provide procedural
protections (for example, an administrative hearing prior to
expulsion), or its officials may summarily expel the individual,
often in violation of domestic or international legal obligations.
The general purpose of renditions, however irregular or
illegal, is to accommodate the receiving state's desire to place the
individual on trial for recognizable criminal offenses. In the
instance of suspected terrorists, however, security concerns of the
rendering state are sometimes the sole motivation, with
indifference to subsequent prosecution or detention of the person
rendered.5 Tragically, repressive governments have rendered
persons with the expectation that they will suffer summary
execution, torture, prolonged arbitrary detention, or unfair
military trial. "Operation Condor" in the Southern Cone States of
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay serves as a
notorious example of this type of abusive collaboration among
military and police forces against alleged "terrorists.,
6
Corrupt local officials occasionally cooperate in the abduction
of criminal suspects, in collaboration with the receiving state, but
without authorization from responsible officials in their own
4. See GEOFF GILBERT, TRANSNATIONAL FUGITIVE OFFENDERS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW: EXTRADITION AND OTHER MECHANISMS 337 (1998).
5. For example, in 1996 Sudan attempted to deport Osama Bin Laden to his state of
origin, Saudi Arabia, under pressure from the United States. When Saudi Arabia refused
to accept Bin Laden and denationalized him, Sudan expelled Bin Laden, who found a safe
haven in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan. In the United Kingdom, 2001 anti-terrorist
legislation permits interned foreigners suspected of terrorist links, but not charged with
any crime or deportable offense, to obtain their release from administrative detention by
agreeing to leave the country. See Amnesty International, Memorandum to the UK
Government on Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001, Al Index: EUR
45/017/2002 (2002) available at http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGEUR450172002
(Sept. 21, 2003) [hereinafter Memorandum]. These departures from the U.K. are
technically "voluntary" and to a state of the detainee's choosing. Thus, they are neither
renditions nor expulsions.
6. See Katie Zoglin, Paraguay's Archive of Terror: International Cooperation and
Operation Condor, 32 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 57,64-74 (2001); see also Roseann M.
Latore, Coming Out of the Dark: Achieving Justice for Victims of Human Rights Violations
by South American Military Regimes, 25 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 419, 421-22, 425
(2002).
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governments.' In other abduction situations, receiving state
officials operate without any official collaboration in the territorial
state to abduct a suspect. Alternatively, they may abduct the
person outside the territory of any state and on the high seas.s
When democratic states engage in such abductions, even of
suspected international terrorists, they generally place the
abductees on trial for recognizable criminal charges, with ordinary
trial rights.
These practices, prior to 2001, raised important questions
concerning the adequacy of the existing system of international
extradition to deal with the peculiar threats posed by international• 9
terrorists. Yet, until the attacks of September 11, 2001, no one
suggested that the subject of international transfer of terrorist
suspects should fall under the rubric of humanitarian law.
Counterterrorism was located in the realm of international
criminal law, in which extradition treaties, refugee law, and human
rights norms imposed significant legal constraints. International
humanitarian law spoke only tangentially to acts of terrorism and
was hardly seen as its primary field of application.0
U.S. practice in the "war against terrorism" meshes uneasily
with known practices of extradition, rendition, and abduction, and
it raises unprecedented legal issues. Approximately 3,000
7. A notorious example is United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 657
(1992). See also Ocalan v. Turkey, 30 Eur. H.R. 231, (2000). Kurdish Workers Party
leader Abdullah Ocalan asserted Turkish agents abducted him in Kenya without
authorization from responsible Kenyan officials. He argued to the European Court of
Human Rights (ECHR) that "[m]ere collusion between unauthorised Kenyan officials and
the Turkish Government could not constitute State cooperation." Id. at 243. The ECHR
held in March 2003 that, although Turkey had violated several provisions of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in its
treatment and trial of Ocalan, his arrest in Kenya did not violate Article 5(1) because
"Kenyan officials had played a role" in his transfer to Turkish authorities. Thus, no
"violation by Turkey of Kenyan sovereignty" had occurred. Ocalan v. Turkey, Judgment
of 12 March 2003, at http://www.echr.coe.int.eng/Judgments.htm, paras. 100, 101 (cite not
available).
8. See United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086, 1089 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (exemplifying
high seas abduction). In the current "war against terrorism," it is not clear whether U.S.
agencies abducted any suspected terrorists without the consent of local officials. Captives
were reportedly seized in states including Bosnia-Herzegovina, Gambia, Zambia,
Indonesia, and Pakistan.
9. See generally CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, AND THE PROTEcTION OF HUMAN LIBERTY (1992); GILBERT,
supra note 4, at 337.
10. Hans-Peter Gasser, Acts of Terror, "Terrorism" and International Humanitarian
Law, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 547 (2002).
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captives," seized in various circumstances and in a number of
different states, have been transferred to detention centers chosen
increasingly for their invulnerability to scrutiny by national courts,
human rights bodies, and agencies responsible for the application
of humanitarian law. Many, although not all, of these captives
were forcibly transferred across national borders. 2  The U.S.
military operates some of these detention facilities (for example,
Camp Delta at Guantdinamo Bay, Cuba, and Bagram Air Base in
Afghanistan). Press reports indicate that the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) may control other extraterritorial
detention facilities.' Some persons apparently are held in facilities
operated by the security services of other states, providing U.S.
officials with access to the detainees for purposes of
interrogation. 14
None of the current estimated 3,000 captives was charged
with a recognizable criminal offense, although some were held for
over one year. No captives were provided access to counsel or
11. President George W. Bush, State of the Union Address, (Jan. 28, 2003), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/01/20030128-19.html (last visited Sept.
21, 2003). This figure had previously appeared in press accounts. I have chosen to use the
term "captives" to describe the persons under detention, in preference to the terms
"prisoners" and "detainees." This terminology avoids implications regarding their status
as prisoners of war, interned "unlawful combatants," or civilians. Difficulties in applying
concepts of international humanitarian law to these captives are addressed in Part IV
infra. While the term "captives" has a certain medieval connotation, this may not be
inappropriate given the suggestions in U.S. policy statements and legal briefs that few if
any legal standards govern these captives' seizure, transfer, and indefinite detention.
Captives in conflicts and political struggles predating the seventeenth century had few
legal rights, and were often executed summarily, enslaved, and ransomed. Yasmin Naqvi,
Doubtful Prisoner-of-War Status, 84 INT'L REV. RED CROSS 571, 573 n.8 (2002); see also
WILLIAM E.S. FLORY, PRISONERS OF WAR: A STUDY IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 10-15 (1942). This Article's primary theme is that the newly
conceived "war against terrorism" has not established a similar legal vacuum.
12. No doubt, some of the captives held at Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan were
seized in that state. Exact figures are not publicly available. Some captives held at
Bagram were apparently seized in Pakistan and possibly other states.
13. Priest & Gellman, supra note 1, at Al. The Washington Post reported in
December 2002 that the CIA was operating detention/interrogation facilities in Diego
Garcia (a British island in the Indian Ocean) and in Jordan. The details concerning
operational control are unclear. Id.
14. Abdul Rahim Al-Nashiri was seized in the United Arab Emirates and transferred
to Jordan, where he is either held by U.S. officials or is made available to them for
purposes of interrogation. Top Qaeda Suspect al-Nashiri Arrested During Pilot Training in
UAE, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 23,2002, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
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family visits.15 Some, but not all, were granted consular access or
visits from the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC). 6 The U.S. Government indicated its intent to intern the
captives as "enemy combatants" indefinitely during the "war
against terrorism;" to subject them to prolonged, intensive
interrogation without access to counsel or family visits; and
possibly to place them on trial before ad hoc military commissions
that do not provide trial rights evuivalent to those in ordinary
criminal courts or in courts martial.'
The forcible transboundary movement of these captives raises
important issues concerning international legal norms governing
state conduct during the "war against terrorism." The position of
the U.S. Administration appears to be that extradition, refugee,
and human rights treaties and customary norms have no
application to these captives, with respect to their seizure or
interstate transfer, and their subsequent interrogation, detention,
or trial.
While the U.S. Administration depicts the seizures and
detentions as an effort to capture and intern combatants in an
international armed conflict, it simultaneously asserts that these
captives have no legal rights either as prisoners of war (POWs)
under the Third Geneva Convention or as civilians under the
Fourth Geneva Convention, both of which contain detailed rules
15. One exception is U.S. citizen John Walker Lindh, who was captured as an alleged
Taliban soldier at Mazar-e-Sharif in Afghanistan, held briefly at Bagram aboard a U.S.
Navy vessel, and then transferred to the United States for his criminal trial in a regular
federal court. United States v. John Walker Lindh, Crim. No. 02-37A (E.D. Va. July 15,
2002) (plea agreement, July 15, 2002).
16. The ICRC publicly reports on its visits to Guant~namo. Guantanamo Bay: 06-01-
2003 Operational Update, at http://www.icrc.orgIWeb/Eng/siteeng0.nsffhtmlI/
5G2GT7?OpenDocument (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). Some detainees held at
Guant~namo received visits from officials of their state of origin. However, it is not clear
if these officials provided consular services or collaborated on interrogations. The Queen
on the Application of Abbasi & Anor v. Secretary of State for Foreign and
Commonwealth Affairs, [2002] EWCA Civ. 1598 (Judgment of 6 Nov. 2002). The ICRC
has "no comment" on its access to captives held in Diego Garcia. The ICRC has an
agreement with Jordan that it may visit all security detainees, but it cannot publicly reveal
whether access was given to specific persons.
17. Military Order, Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the
War Against Terrorism (Nov. 13, 2001), 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001) [hereinafter
Military Order].
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on transfer and wartime internment."' As a matter of "'policy," the
U.S. Government asserts that it treats these captives humanely,
but its interrogation and detention practices have come under
increasingly critical scrutiny. 9 This Article addresses only the
legality of the forcible interstate transfers and does not address
issues relating to conditions of detention.
The U.S. Government operates as if there are no legal
constraints on its flexibility to transfer captives from one state to
another in order to maximize their isolation and susceptibility to
interrogation. As seizures occur more frequently in locations far
removed from any conventional battlefield, the dangers of erosion
of extradition, refugee, and human rights norms for suspected
terrorists loom ever larger. Prior to September 11, 2001,
counterterrorism had been approached as an issue of international
criminal law and mutual criminal assistance. The renditions
analyzed here highlight gaps and ambiguities in international legal
principles arising from the attempted reconceptualization of the
current struggle against terrorism as an international armed
conflict.2°
Part II of this Article provides concrete examples of irregular
transfers of captives in the "war against terrorism," in order to
provide context for the legal analysis. Part III examines
established extradition, refugee protection, and human rights
principles applicable to interstate transfer of suspected terrorists.
These norms continue to be applied in extraditions of suspected Al
Qaeda operatives and other alleged terrorists arrested in
democratic states. Part IV analyzes humanitarian law rules
concerning transfers of prisoners of war, unprivileged combatants,
and interned civilians in light of the highly ambiguous status of the
captives in the "war against terrorism." The Article concludes
with recommendations for striking a proper balance to preserve
the fundamental rights of the captives while accommodating the
security interests of states collaborating in counterterrorist
measures.
18. White House Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo (Feb. 7, 2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html [hereinafter White
House Fact Sheet] (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
19. Id. (describing "policy"); see also Ends, Means and Barbarity- Torture,
ECONOMIST, Jan. 11, 2003, LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
20. See Joan Fitzpatrick, Speaking Law to Power: The War Against Terrorism and
Human Rights, 14 EUR. J. INT'L L. 241 (2003).
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II. RENDITION, TRANSFER, AND EXTRADITION IN THE "WAR
AGAINST TERRORISM"
There are 3,000 distinct stories behind the seizure and
detention of the 3,000 captives currently held by the United States
in the "war against terrorism." Many follow a rather conventional
scenario involving battlefield seizures of Taliban combatants
during the internationalized internal armed conflict in Afghanistan
beginning in October 2001.21 Some of these captives never crossed
an international boundary and remain in U.S. military custody in
Afghanistan. Other captives, however, were transferred thousands
of miles away to Guantdinamo Bay and other remote detention
centers. There, they are held as unprivileged combatants and
denied prisoner of war status pursuant to a controversial February
2002 Order by U.S. President George W. Bush.2  A number of
persons alleged to be Al Qaeda fighters, and not members of the
Taliban armed forces, were also seized in battlefield settings and
are being denied prisoner of war status.
On the assumption that some of the captives meet the
definition of the Third Geneva Convention for prisoners of war
and others do not, the transfers of those captured in battlefield
situations in Afghanistan will be examined in Part IV, in light of
humanitarian law norms relating to the transfer of prisoners of war
and of unprivileged combatants. In addition, assuming some of
the captives were not combatants, humanitarian law rules on
internment, transfer, and deportation of civilians during
international armed conflict will also be examined.23
21. George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002). The internal armed conflict in Afghanistan
persisted for a quarter-century by 2001. From time to time, this conflict became
internationalized through the direct intervention of other states, such as the Soviet Union
and, more recently, the United States. When the United States launched a massive
military attack upon the Taliban regime in October 2001 in collaboration with the
Northern Alliance and various Afghan warlords, experts on international humanitarian
law generally accepted that the conflict changed its character from an internal armed
conflict to an international armed conflict. This characterization is significant, especially
with respect to the treatment of captured combatants, because humanitarian law rules for
international and internal armed conflict are distinct.
22. Military Order, supra note 17, at 833.
23. Two elderly Afghan men, who claimed not to have engaged in acts of combat,
were released from Guantinamo in October 2002, after nearly a year in detention. David
Rohde, Afghans Freed from Guantdnamo Speak of Heat and Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Oct.
29, 2002, at A14. In March 2003 an additional twenty-two Guantdnamo captives were
2003]
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The second general scenario involves persons who allegedly
participated in the armed conflict in Afghanistan, later fled that
state, and were seized in other states and then transferred to U.S.
custody across international boundaries. One such example may
be Martin Mubanga, a citizen of the United Kingdom who was
reportedly seized in Zambia and subsequently transferred toS 24
Guantanamo. Two other captives were also seized in Gambia,
although it is unclear whether they are suspected of fighting in
Afghanistan. 25 Two prominent alleged Al Qaeda operatives, Abu
Zubaydah and Ramzi Bin al Shibh, were reportedly captured in
Pakistan with the cooperation of Pakistani officials and later• 2 6
transferred to U.S. detention in an unknown location. Some
Guantdnamo captives were possibly seized in Pakistan and the
U.S. Government controversially asserted its right to cross into
Pakistani territory in "hot pursuit" of Taliban or Al Qaeda
fighters.27
The third scenario arises from the expansive geographic scope
of the "war against terrorism," as conceived by U.S. officials. 28 Six
repatriated to Afghanistan. Neil Lewis, Detainees From the Afghan War Remain in a
Legal Limbo in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2003, at Al.
24. Ian Burrell, Britons at Camp Delta Make a Sorry Bunch of Warriors,
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 3, 2002, at http://www.news.independent.co.uk/world/Americas/
story.jsp?story=320983 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
25. Amnesty International, USA: One Year On - the Legal Limbo of the Guantdnamo
Detainees Continues, Al Index: AMR 51/002/2003, Jan. 10, 2003, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGAMR510022003 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003)
(here Amnesty International investigates reports that two men of Iraqi and Jordanian
nationality were rendered from Gambia to Guantinamo).
26. Pakistan Trying to Identify Al-Qaeda Suspects, No Extradition Plans Yet, AGENCE
FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. Pakistan
has rendered 420 Al Qaeda suspects to the United States since September 11, 2001,
including Abu Zubaydah and Ramzi Bin al Shibh. Id.
27. Rumsfeld Meets with Pakistani Foreign Minister, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan.
28, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
28. The National Security Strategy issued by President Bush describes the geographic
scope of the "war against terrorism" in the following terms:
The United States of America is fighting a war against terrorism of global reach.
The enemy is not a single political regime or person or religion or ideology. The
enemy is terrorism-premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated
against innocents.
The struggle against global terrorism is different from any other war in our
history. It will be fought on many fronts against a particularly elusive enemy
over an extended period of time. Progress will come through the persistent
accumulation of successes-some seen, some unseen.
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Algerian nationals, several of whom possess dual Bosnian
nationality, were arrested in Sarajevo on suspicion of terrorist
involvement in October 2001, but were ordered released for lack
of evidence in January 2002 by the Bosnian Supreme Court. The
next day, however, Bosnian police rendered them to U.S. forces
attached to the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), which
immediately transferred them to Guant~inamo. There is no
evidence that any were involved in the international armed conflict
in Afghanistan. Their irregular rendition was found to violate
human rights treaties and domestic Bosnian law by the Human
Rights Chamber for Bosnia-Herzegovina.29 U.S. officials asserted
that the rendered men were involved in Islamist terrorist activities,
but no evidence was submitted to Bosnian judicial authorities
during the abortive extradition proceedings.
Abdul Rahim Al-Nashiri, an alleged Al Qaeda operative
complicit in the bombing of the USS Cole, was seized in the
United Arab Emirates and rendered to Jordan for purposes of
interrogation and detention. It is unclear if he is under detention
by Jordanian authorities, and on what basis, or if he is being held
in a portion of Jordanian territory ceded to the U.S. CIA.30 Omar
Al-Faruq, allegedly a leader of Jemaah Islamiyya in Indonesia, was
reportedly arrested in Jakarta in June 2002 and is being detained
by the United States at an undisclosed location.31 Mohammed
Today, our enemies have seen the result of what civilized nations can, and will,
do against regimes that harbor, support, and use terrorism to achieve their
political goals. Afghanistan has been liberated; coalition forces continue to hunt
down the Taliban and al-Qaida. But it is not only this battlefield on which we
will engage terrorists. Thousands of trained terrorists remain at large with cells
in North America, South America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and across
Asia.
THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 5 (Sept.
2002), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003)
[hereinafter NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY].
29. Press Release, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Human
Rights Chamber Delivers 3 Decisions on Admissibility and Merits (Oct. 11, 2002),
available at http://www.hrc.ba/english/press-eng/pressEng/october02.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2003); Boudella v. Bosnia, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia Herzegovina,
CH/02/8679, CH/02/8689, CH/02/8690 and CH/02/8691, 323 (Oct. 11, 2002).
30. Patrick E. Tyler, Arrested Qaeda Figure Was Training for Flight, INT'L HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 24-25, 2002, at 1; see generally Western Agents Provided Tip for Arrest of Top
Al-Qaeda Suspect in UAE, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Dec. 24. 2002, available at LEXIS,
News Library, Curnws File.
31. Raymond Bonner and Jane Perlez, Bali Bomb Plotters Said to Plan to Hit Foreign
Schools in Jakarta, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
2003]
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Heidar Zammar, a dual German-Syrian national allegedly
involved in Al Qaeda activities in Germany, was reportedly seized
in Morocco and rendered to Syria at the request of U.S. officials.
The fourth scenario involves irregular rendition from the
United States of persons suspected of terrorist links. Maher Arar,
a dual Canadian-Syrian national, was arrested at a U.S. airport by
U.S. immigration authorities while in transit to his home in
Canada and summarily deported to Syria, where he remains in
detention without charge or trial. It is unclear if U.S. authorities
were given access to Mr. Arar while in Syrian custody. Canada
strenuously protested this irregular rendition.
The fifth scenario reverts to conventional extradition. These
cases involve persons arrested by democratic governments on the
basis of information supplied by U.S. officials relating to alleged
terrorist activities. Instances include the cases of Lotfi Raissi and
Khalid AI-Fawwaz in the United Kingdom and two Yemenis
arrested in Germany.33 Governments, especially E.U. States,
sought assurances that such extraditees will be granted fair trials in
ordinary criminal courts and will not face the death penalty. U.S.
officials are required in these cases to establish that they have
satisfied the traditional requisites for extradition.
III. TREATMENT OF TERRORIST SUSPECTS UNDER EXTRADITION,
REFUGEE, AND HUMAN RIGHTS NORMS
Prior to the attacks of September 11, 2001, the transfer of
suspected terrorists across international boundaries was generally
regarded as a matter implicating extradition, refugee, and human
rights norms. The United States formerly treated even Osama Bin
File; Derwin Pereira, Yemeni National a Key Player in Bali Bomb Blasts; The Al-Qaeda
Operative Is Suspected of Calling the Shots on the Ground - Under the Orders of Osama
Bin Laden, STRAITS TIMES (Singapore), Nov. 26, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File (reporting that the United States is detaining AI-Faruq in Afghanistan).
32. Daniel J. Wakin, Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back to Syria
on Terror Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
33. See Daniel McGrory, US Fails to Win Extradition from Britain of Al-Qaeda
Suspect, THE TIMES (London), July 30, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws
File; In re Al-Fawwaz, 69 URHL (2001); Ian Fisher and Mark Landler, Germans Arrest 2
Yemenis at U.S. Request, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2003, at A8.
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Laden as a criminal, indicting him for criminal acts and repeatedly
requesting his rendition from Afghanistan to stand trial.34
The failure of states to render certain terrorist suspects, even
in the absence of binding extradition relations between the
requesting state and the requested state, however, has come to the
attention of the Security Council. In response, the Security
Council on occasion has characterized the refusal to render the
suspects as a threat to international peace and security, justifying
the imposition of economic sanctions pursuant to Article 41 of the
U.N. Charter.35 Major powers, such as the United States, also
justified the use of military force against states harboring terrorist
suspects on a theory of reprisal or pre-emptive self-defense prior
to the events of September 11.36
But the "war against terrorism," as currently implemented by
the United States, represents a dramatic change in the legal
conceptualization of the bases for seizing, transferring, and
detaining suspected terrorists. One of the greatest departures
from past practice is the fate of those rendered-indefinite
detention without charge or trial. The international criminal law
model appears partially abandoned in order to justify this policy
shift. As shown below, in its dealings with democratic states, the
34. The United States does not have extradition relations with Afghanistan. Security
Council resolutions 1193, 1214, and 1267 state the duty of Afghanistan is to transfer Bin
Laden to states that have indicted him, but do not cite any specific treaty obligation to
extradite. S.C. Res. 1267, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess., 4051st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1267
(1999); see also S.C. Res. 1193, 52d Sess., 3921st mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1193 (1998) and
S.C. Res. 1214, 53d Sess., 3952d mtg., U.N. Doc S/RES/1214 (1998).
35. The Lockerbie case (involving the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in 1988) is
perhaps the most prominent example. Security Council resolution 748 of March 1992
imposed economic sanctions against Libya for its failure to extradite two Libyan agents to
the United Kingdom or the United States. S.C. Res. 748, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3063d
mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/748 (1992). Libya is a party to the Montreal Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, which has an aut
dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) provision, but offered to try rather than to
extradite the suspects, on the basis that they were Libyan nationals. Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 24
U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177. The suspects were eventually tried in a Scottish court sitting
in the Netherlands, in 2000-2001.
36. See Abraham D. Sofaer, Terrorism and the Law, 64 FOREIGN AFFS. 901, 921
(1986); Secretary Shultz, Low-Intensity Warfare: The Challenge of Ambiguity, Address
Before the Low-Intensity Conference (Jan. 15, 1986) in CURRENT POL'Y No. 783,
BUREAU OF PUB. AFF., U.S. DEPT. OF STATE. The United States bombed Libya in 1986
in reprisal for terrorist attacks in Rome and Vienna the prior year. John F. Murphy, The
Future of Multilateralism and Efforts to Combat International Terrorism, 25 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 35,86-88 (1986).
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Bush Administration is largely forced to continue to operate
within the established international criminal law framework.
Where, as a result of collusion or legal underdevelopment in
rendering states, U.S. officials are able to cause the irregular
rendition of suspected terrorists, these officials appear to favor
incommunicado detention of the suspect, over charge and trial. By
depicting the detentions as a form of wartime internment, the
United States seeks to silence criticism of the captives' conditions
of detention and of its failure to charge and try them for
recognizable criminal offenses.
Prior practice was hardly respectful of the rights of terrorist
suspects. On the other hand, certain basic principles became
widely accepted. These established principles relate to substantive
limits and procedural guarantees for extradition; circumstances
under which refugee protection was granted or denied; bans on
nonrefoulement to regimes with serious human rights violations;
second state complicity for human rights violations committed in
states to which victims are forcibly transferred; and the
expectation that the receiving state would grant the suspect a fair
trial on recognizable criminal charges. These norms are described
in the following sections.
A. Terrorism, Extradition, and Rendition
A complex relationship exists between terrorism and
extradition. First, a major aim of multilateral counterterrorism
treaties is to prohibit states from harboring terrorists by imposing
an aut dedere aut judicare (extradite or prosecute) obligation.
Binding and streamlined extradition obligations were traditionally
perceived as a primary counterterrorist strategy.38
Second, states keen on effective counterterrorist strategies,
especially against Islamists, were not satisfied with the regime
37. See GILBERT, supra note 4, at 320-29.
38. The 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, opened for
signature Jan. 27, 1977, Europ. T.S. No. 90, 15 ILM 1272, is a model for counterterrorism
treaties that dispenses with the political offense exception and substitutes a
discrimination/persecution exception. Otto Lagodny, The European Convention on the
Suppression of Terrorism: A Substantial Step to Combat Terrorism?, 60 U. COLO. L. REV.
583, 584-86 (1989). The United States and the United Kingdom renegotiated their
bilateral extradition treaty in order to eliminate the political offense exception, which
blocked the extradition of several IRA suspects, and substituted an alteration in the non-
inquiry rule. BLAKESLEY, supra note 9, at 74-88.
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established under the multilateral counterterrorism treaties.
States harboring terrorists tend not to ratify these multilateral
treaties and often lack bilateral extradition relations with
democratic states interested in prosecuting international terrorists.
Irregular rendition figured in democratic state practice regarding
terrorist suspects prior to September 2001, but generally with the
aim of subjecting the rendered suspect to non-military trial on
recognizable criminal charges. Among repressive governments, in
contrast, terrorist suspects are sometimes irregularly rendered
across national boundaries only to disappear, or be summarily
executed, tortured, arbitrarily detained, or subjected to unfair
military trials. Such practices were widely regarded as gross
human rights violations.
Several principles of extradition law may place obstacles in
the way of securing the presence of a suspected terrorist. The rule
of double criminality is one such important limit. 9 Especially with
respect to complex and recently defined crimes, such as those
concerning inchoate offenses, extraterritorial crimes, and the
financing of terrorist activities, perfect congruence between the
criminal laws of the requesting state and the requested state may
be lacking. The rule of specialty also limits the charges upon
which an extradited suspect may be tried, preventing the
requesting state from prosecuting crimes not included in the
warrant of extradition, even if evidence of those crimes is
available.
Formerly, the political offense exception prevented a number
of extraditions of suspected terrorists, for example members of the
Irish Republican Army (IRA). However, this barrier diminishes
as treaties are renegotiated to eliminate the exception or to
depoliticize certain terrorist acts that endanger civilians or inflict
harm out of proportion to the political objectives of the alleged
terrorists.4°
Inconsistencies in evidentiary rules may impede the
extradition of suspects from common law to civil law states. This
barrier may be lowered by revisions to treaties and statutes to
39. See, e.g., In Re AI-Fawwaz, 69 URHL (2001) (providing extensive discussions on
the double criminality rule).
40. Lagodny, supra note 38, at 585-86.
2003]
470 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 25:457
reduce the burden of establishing a prima facie case.4' Transfers
between common law jurisdictions may be impeded by the
obligation to make an evidentiary showing, especially where the
requesting state is unwilling to disclose confidential information
that might establish that an individual is involved in terrorist
activities.42 Overall, statistics on formal extradition of accused
terrorists indicate that substantial barriers exist in practice.43
Many democratic states participate in the counterterrorist
coalition and continue to apply ordinary extradition rules with
respect to suspects arrested on their territory or they subject the
suspects to an ordinary criminal trial in their own courts.44 The
41. For example, European Union treaties from the 1990s supplemented the 1957
European Convention on Extradition, and altered the prima facie case requirement in the
United Kingdom in 1990. GILBERT, supra note 4, at 127-41.
42. For example, Lotfi Raissi was denied extradition from the United Kingdom to the
United States. Magistrate Timothy Workman denied extradition on all eight charges,
noting that "[s]everal allegations involving terrorism have been made, but I would like to
make it clear that I have received no evidence to support that contention." Daniel
McGory, 'Terror Pilot' Case Dismissed, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 25, 2002, available at
LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
43. Kittrie found that from 1970 to 1975, 267 suspected terrorists were arrested, 50
were convicted, 39 freed, 58 were given safe conduct to another state, and 16 were
released under pressure of terrorist threats. None was extradited. The fates of 104 others
are still unknown. Evans traced 353 persons involved in hijackings from 1977 to 1982; only
one was extradited. D. Cameron Findlay, Abducting Terrorists Overseas for Trial in the
United States, 23 TEX. INT'L L. J. 2, 8 (1988).
44. For example, a suspect was extradited from Spain to France to stand trial for a
plot to bomb the Strasbourg Cathedral in December 2000. See Emma Daly, Spain Arrests
16 Suspected of Ties to Al Queda, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2003, available at LEXIS, News
Library, Majap File. The extradition of another suspect arrested in Britain is sought with
respect to the same plot. France Seeks Arrest of Man Detained in British Subway Plot,
AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Nov. 30, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
Other suspects accused of planning terrorist attacks in France are being tried in Germany.
Four men were convicted of complicity in the Strasbourg plot in March 2003 by a German
court in Frankfurt. Mark Landler, Germans Convict Four Algerians in Plot to Bomb a
French Market, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Majpap
File. A Dutch citizen of Ethiopian origin was extradited from Canada in July 2002 to
stand trial in the Netherlands with three other men for an alleged plot to bomb the U.S.
Embassy in Paris. All four were acquitted for lack of evidence and the Dutch judges
expressed surprise that Canada found sufficient evidence to extradite. Peter Finn, Four
Acquitted in Bomb Plot Against U.S. Embassy in Paris; Terror Probe Skirted Normal
Procedures, Dutch Panel Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 19, 2002, available at LEXIS, News
Library. The trial of Mounir El Motassadeq in Hamburg, Germany, for alleged complicity
in the attacks of September 11 is especially noteworthy because U.S. officials refused to
permit the court to question Ramzi Bin al Shibh, the alleged paymaster of both the
September 11 hijackers and of Zacarias Moussaoui. Astrid Geisler, Final Pleas Expected
Next Week in German September 11 Trial, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 24, 2003,
available at NEXIS, News Library, Curnws File. El Motassadeq was convicted and
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refusal of E.U. States to extradite suspects facing capital charges
imposes a significant barrier to extradition of terrorist suspects to
the United States. Irregular renditions from European states to
U.S. operated detention centers for "enemy combatants" do not
appear to be occurring and incidents of U.S. organized abductions
from European allies were not reported.
Thus, the current picture regarding seizure and transfer of
terrorist suspects is quite mixed. Many persons seized in states
outside of Europe with the tacit or formal collaboration of local
officials are being irregularly rendered to U.S. detention centers.
There, they are held indefinitely without charge or trial and
without access to counsel or family. In contrast, persons arrested
on terrorist charges in European states are rarely rendered to U.S.
custody. Established principles of extradition law continue to
apply to such persons and serious prosecutions on ordinary
criminal charges are frequently undertaken in cases where
extradition is not possible. The attempted reconceptualization of
the "war against terrorism" as a matter of humanitarian law, rather
than as a matter implicating traditional rules of extradition and
criminal law, is not accepted by democratic states.45
B. Terrorism and Refugee Law
Preventing terrorists from enjoying safe haven, thereby
obtaining impunity for past and future crimes, is an objective of
counterterrorism. Refugee protection is not available for persons
who have committed certain crimes described in Article 1F of the
1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, namely
crimes against peace, war crimes, and crimes against humanity;
serious nonpolitical crimes; and acts contrary to the purposes and
principles of the United Nations.46
sentenced to fifteen years in prison in February 2003. Desmond Butler, First Conviction in
9/11 Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, Majpap File.
45. The Australian Prime Minister did suggest to his Asian neighbors that Australia
might implement the Bush Administration doctrine of pre-emptive self-defense to take
forceful action against states that harbor terrorist cells. This announcement provoked a
negative reaction from some governments, including Malaysia, and the policy is not yet in
effect. Brendan Nicholson, The State of Australia's Regional Relations, SUNDAY AGE
(Melbourne), Dec. 29, 2002, available at NEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
46. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. 1F, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
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The interpretation and application of these exclusion clauses,
however, present complex and difficult issues."7 It is not clear
whether every suspected terrorist falls within the scope of Article
48iF. Nevertheless, after the attacks of September 11, preventing
the grant of asylum to suspected terrorists emerged as an
important objective in the "war against terrorism." This is
reflected in the broad language of Security Council resolution
13734 9 An increasing number of suspected terrorists arrested in
Europe appear to be asylees or asylum seekers, a development
that could result in a tightening of access to asylum, especially for
persons from predominantly Muslim states. More recently, the
Secuity Council in January 2003 cautioned states that they must
"ensure that any measure taken to combat terrorism comply with
all their obligations under international law, and [states] should
adopt such measures in accordance with international law, in
particular international human rights, refugee, and humanitarian
law. 5
Substantive and procedural issues are posed where a person
suspected of terrorist involvement seeks to prevent his involuntary
transfer from a state in which he sought refuge. This transfer
could take the form of extradition, deportation or expulsion, or
irregular rendition. The substantive issues primarily relate to the
scope of the exclusion clauses, as well as the security-related
exceptions to the principle of nonrefoulement, and the extent to
which these exclusionary provisions of refugee law encompass
47. See generally Exclusion from Protection, 12 INT. J. REF. L. SPECIAL
SUPPLEMENTARY ISSUE (2001). This study, undertaken by a Legal Advisory Group
convened by the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, contains a detailed analysis of
the complexities of interpreting Article iF.
48. Walter Kalin and Jorg Kunzli, Article IF(b): Freedom Fighters, Terrorists, and the
Notion of Serious Non-Political Crimes, 12 INT. J. REF. L. 46 (2000).
49. Security Council resolution 1373 of 28 September 2001, para. 3(f), calls upon
states to:
[t]ake appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of
national and international law, including international standards of human
rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the
asylum-seeker has not planned, facilitated or participated in the commission of
terrorist acts . ...
S.C. Res 1373, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4385th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (2001);
Monette Zard, Exclusion, Terrorism and the Refugee Convention, 13 FORCED
MIGRATION REV. 32 (2002).
50. S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., 4688th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/Res/1456 (2003).
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terrorist acts.51  The procedural issues encompass how the
exclusion clauses should be applied. A key question is whether
summary exclusion, without consideration of the risk of
persecution, is permitted. Irregular rendition, especially when it
takes the form of summary expulsion or abduction, deprives the
subject of an opportunity to enjoy protection from potential
persecution and serious human rights violations. As such, it poses
a serious danger to the international refugee regime and to
fundamental human rights.
Article 1F reflects an important, if somewhat surprising,
concept in refugee law-that certain persons are undeserving of
refugee protection even if their involuntary return results in
persecution. The reference to crimes against peace, war crimes,
and crimes against humanity in Article 1F(a) is historically
grounded in the context of the Refugee Convention's original aim
to resolve the problems posed by forced displacement in Europe in
the aftermath of World War II. To extend refugee protection to
war criminals might undermine public acceptance of the legitimacy
of the emerging refugee regime. The text of Article 1F(a),
however, adopts a progressive interpretation of the crimes that
subject an asylum seeker to exclusion, linking its scope to the
evolution of international humanitarian norms and expanding
concepts of crimes against humanity.
For example, certain acts of terrorism committed during
52armed conflict constitute war crimes. Further, the attacks of
September 11 illustrate that the current definition of crimes
against humanity, as reflected in the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), encompasses some peacetime acts of
organized terrorist groups.53 Thus, even though terrorism per se
was excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICC, that body may play
an important role in the prosecution of future acts of terrorism
51. Article IF of the Refugee Convention excludes certain persons from the refugee
definition. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, art. iF, 189
U.N.T.S. 137. Article 33(2) conditions the principle of nonrefoulement of refugees set
forth in Article 33(1). Id. art. 33. Article 33(2) permits asylum states to return refugees,
even to states in which they fear persecution, if the refugees have committed a particularly
serious crime in, and pose a danger to, the asylum state; or if the refugee is a threat to the
security of that state. Id.
52. Gasser, supra note 10.
53. Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court, U.N. Diplomatic Conference of
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, 52d Sess., art.
7, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, adopted July 17, 1998 [hereinafter ICC Statute].
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committed on a large scale. 4 The ICC's interpretation of its
Statute may likewise influence understanding of the scope of
Article 1F(a) of the Refugee Convention as applied to suspected
terrorists.
Article 1F(b), excluding persons who are suspected of serious
non-political crimes as refugees, implicates many of the same
issues that arise with respect to the applicability of suspected
terrorists to the political offense exception from extradition.
Refugee protection is not intended to shield fugitives from
accountability for serious crimes that they committed prior to
seeking refuge, or to interfere with appropriate extradition of such
offenders. The addition of the qualifier "non-political," however,
suggests that certain political offenders should receive refugee
protection.
The difficulty is that no common understanding of the
political offense exception exists. Practice in the extradition
context is quite diverse, even among states with similar political
traditions.55 A trend toward depoliticizing serious terrorist crimes
appears to be emerging, following two different models. The first
is to negotiate new extradition instruments that abolish the
political offense exception among certain democratic states or for
56certain terrorist crimes. The second is to apply in practice a
proportionality concept that holds certain terrorist crimes against
civilians as unjustified by any political objectives of the
perpetrator. The case of Eain v. Wilkes is an example of the latter
approach. A similar proportionality principle was utilized to
depoliticize certain politically motivated crimes for the purpose of
excluding an asylum seeker from refugee protection. 8
Although there is apparent congruence between the political
offense exception to extradition and Article 1F(b) of the Refugee
Convention, disparity in outcomes between extradition
proceedings and deportation proceedings involving the same
54. The ICC's jurisdiction is limited to crimes committed after its Statute's entry into
force on July 1, 2002.
55. GILBERT, supra note 4, at 203-46. For example, Britain uses the "incidence" test,
the French limit extradition to purely political offenses, and the Swiss use the
proportionality test. Id. See also John Dugard & Christine Van den Wyngaert,
Reconciling Extradition with Human Rights, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 187 (1998).
56. See Lagodny, supra note 38, at 585
57. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981).
58. See, e.g., T v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2 All E.R. 816 (1996).
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individual occurs. For example, in the Doherty case, the
extradition of a suspected IRA member was repeatedly rejected
under the previous U.S-U.K. extradition treaty, although Doherty
was later denied asylum and deported to the United Kingdom.59
The third category of excludable conduct, acts contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United Nations set out in Article
1F(c), is the vaguest. This is because the United Nations acted
vigorously in adopting a dozen counterterrorism treaties and in
placing the "war against terrorism" high on the collective security
agenda. Some argue that Article 1F(c) mandates denial of asylum
to suspected terrorists. Similar arguments were raised regarding
drug traffickers, also the target of much U.N. crime-control
activity. 60 The U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
suggested that, in keeping with the appropriately restrictive
application of the exclusion clauses, that Article 1F(c) should be
limited to political leaders who misuse their authority. Launching
an aggressive war would be an example of misuse. 6' So
interpreted, Article 1F(c) is inapplicable to nonstate terrorist
groups such as Al Qaeda.
Procedurally, the key issues implicated by the application of
the exclusion clauses to suspected terrorists concern: (1) the
evidentiary burden, which involves clarification of the "reasonable
grounds to believe" standard of Article 1F; (2) whether refugee
status determination officials are required to balance the risk of
persecution against the seriousness of the excludable act; and (3)
whether asylum applications in which excludability for terrorist
acts is in issue can be pretermitted or channeled to summary
processes.
Conviction of a crime is not needed to qualify for exclusion
under Article 1F. In the case of suspected terrorists, sensitive or
confidential information may be the sole source of "grounds to
believe" that an asylum applicant is excludable. No clear
consensus exists on the burden of proof, with practice varying from
a low "probable cause" standard, to a "preponderance of the
59. United States v. Doherty, 506 U.S. 1002 (1992).
60. Pushpanathan v. Canada [1998] 1 S.C.R. 982; see also, Edward Kwakwa, Article
1F(c): Acts Contrary to the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations, 12 INT'L. J. REF.
L. 79 (2000).
61. Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the
1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, $ 149, 163, U.N. Doc. HCR/1P/4/REV.2 (1992).
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evidence" standard, to a more protective "clear and convincing"
approach.
In many cases, refugee status determination officials lack
detailed knowledge concerning the applicant. The exclusion issue
may arise based upon information supplied by the applicant. For
example, an asylum seeker may try to bolster his application by
asserting that officials in his state of origin suspect him of
involvement with a terrorist group and will consequently persecute
him if deported. Thus, a serious risk exists that terrorist suspects
will be denied refugee protection on the basis of evidence with
little probative value, since the evidence is not subject to careful
examination in a rigorous procedure. This is especially true where
a consensus emerges that all persons suspected of any direct or
indirect terrorist involvement should categorically be denied
asylum. If this occurs, a dilution of evidentiary standards in the
application of the exclusion clauses could result.
The second procedural issue, the debate over balancing, is
also likely to affect asylum of suspected terrorists. UNHCR urges
that status determination officials consider both evidence relating
to the degree and risk of persecution as well as evidence of
possible involvement in excludable conduct.62 The balancing
requirement is not uniformly accepted in state practice.63 Thus,
categorical bars to asylum for persons suspected of terrorist
involvement might be applied to require disposition of the
exclusion issue prior to any consideration of the risk of
persecution.
Similarly, categorical bars to refugee protection for suspected
terrorists might result in the denial of any procedural protections
to such persons, or the summary rejection of their asylum claims as
manifestly ill founded. The consequence of denying asylum
hearings to such persons and their subjection to summary
expulsion or irregular rendition is that suspects may be deprived of
an opportunity to establish bona fide claims to refugee protection
or to the mandatory bars on forced return to serious human rights
violations.
62. Id. [ 156.
63. See, e.g., INS v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415 (1999) (rejecting balancing).
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C. Terrorism and the Human Rights Bars to Refoulement
Pursuant to several widely ratified human rights treaties,
persons may not be expelled or extradited to states in which they
would suffer certain severe human rights violations. The most
prominent human rights bars to refoulement can be found in
Article 3 of the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel,
Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention
Against Torture); in Article 7 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);65 and in Article 3 of the
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention). 6 A concern to
prevent extradition or expulsion that would result in torture is the
primary focus of these provisions. The prohibition on torture is
regarded as nonderogable, not subject to any exclusions, and also
binding where the rendering state is a party to the treaty but the
receiving state is not.67 The ICCPR and the European Convention
go further than the Convention Against Torture in extending the
nonrefoulement principle to persons who face a risk of cruel,
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment in the state in
68which they face involuntary return.
The human rights bars to refoulement are implicated by
additional human rights, but in a less clear or categorical fashion.
The European Court of Human Rights and the Human Rights
Committee have required that state parties cancel certain
deportations where the consequence would be a denial of the right
to family life resulting from forced separation from family
members.69 Unlike refoulement to torture, the right to family life
64. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment, adopted Dec. 9,1975, 1465 U.N.T.S. 113, 114.
65. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171,174 [hereinafter ICCPR].
66. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
67. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 413,414 (1996). The Chahal case,
involving a Sikh suspected of terrorist involvement and facing deportation from the
United Kingdom to India, contains an extensive discussion of these principles. Id. at 424-
25.
68. See, e.g., Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (1989).
69. See, e.g., Hendrik Winata v. Australia, Hum. Rts. Comm., 72d Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 (2001); Mehemi v. France, Eur. Ct. H.R. 1959 (1997); Boultif v.
Switzerland, App. No. 54273/00, Eur. Ct. H.R. Judgment, Aug. 2, 2001, at
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/hudocNiewRoot.asp?Item=O&Action=Html&X=1122011130&N
otice=0&Noticemode=&RelatedMode=0 (last visited Sept. 21, 2003).
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is subject to certain limitations and balances the applicant's
interest in preserving his family against the state's interest in
removing him. Thus, persons involved in serious acts of terrorism
would likely face difficulty in establishing that their extradition or
expulsion was disproportionate to the deprivation of their right to
family life.
Another area of potential development of human rights bars
is the risk of return to unfair trial or to arbitrary detention. As
Geoff Gilbert notes, the jurisprudence on this point is not as
developed as the anti-torture principle.7 0 This issue has obvious
relevance to the renditions of captives to U.S. detention centers
operating in the "war against terrorism." These persons are
subjected to indefinite incommunicado detention. Further, the
captives are at risk of being placed on trial, not before ordinary
courts, but before ad hoc military commissions applying trial
standards that fall short of humanitarian law norms and of human
71rights obligations applicable in states of emergency.
Substantive deprivation of freedom of movement rights is also
implicated in irregular renditions and forced interstate transfers.
Among the complex of rights embraced by the freedom of
movement is the right to return to one's own country. During civil
conflicts and military dictatorships in South America, for example,
some persons were sentenced to forced exile, giving rise to claims
that they were deprived of the right to return to their own country.
The right to return is also seen as creating a reciprocal obligation
on the part of the state of nationality to accept the return of its
citizens, for example in the deportation context.
This issue may have special relevance with respect to Afghans
detained in centers such as Camp Delta at Guantdinamo. Afghans
70. GILBERT, supra note 4, at 169-70.
71. General Comment on Article 4, U.N. GAOR, Human Rights Comm., 55th. Sess.,
1950th mtg., at 4-5, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.l/Add.11 (2001) [hereinafter General
Comment]: Report on Terrorism and Human Rights, Inter-Am. C. H. R.,
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, doc. 5 rev. 1 corr. (2002) [hereinafter Report on Terrorism].
72. This obligation is codified in the recent U.N. Protocols on trafficking in human
beings and migrant smuggling. Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention
against Transnational Organized Crime, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, U.N. Doc.
A155/383 Annex II, art. 8(1) (2000); Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land,
Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime, opened for signature Nov. 15, 2000, U.N. Doc. A/55/383 Annex II, art.
18(1) (2000).
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appear to comprise one of the largest nationality groups confined
at Guantdnamo. Many Afghans probably had civil or military
links to the Taliban, while others may have been active in Al
Qaeda. Still others appear to be noncombatant civilians with no
links to the Taliban 3 The Northern Alliance apparently continues
to detain large numbers of persons alleged to be Taliban or Al
Qaeda fighters inside Afghanistan. Still other Afghans are
detained at Bagram Air Base under U.S. control. Why many were
transported 8,000 miles to Guantdnamo (and possibly to other
remote U.S. detention camps) and the criteria of selection for
transfer remains unclear.
Whatever their status under humanitarian law, each of the
remotely held captives has a right to repatriation at the cessation
of active hostilities in Afghanistan, unless they are fairly tried and
convicted for violations of the laws of war or recognizable criminal
offenses. 4 Whether they may simultaneously, or at an earlier stage
in their captivity, also claim a right to return to their own country
under international human rights law is also unclear.
Those who truly are noncombatants have the strongest claim.
As noted in Part IV.C infra, civilians are subject to internment
during international armed conflict only under narrow criteria of
necessity, and then only if they are located in occupied territory or
if they are enemy aliens on the territory of a party to the conflict.
Neither of these situations exists in the "war against terrorism,"
nor did either situation arise in the Afghan conflict. Thus, civilians
among the 3,000 captives must be regarded not as wartime
internees, but as persons subjected to a form of administrative
detention governed by human rights norms.
The current practice of irregular rendition in the "war against
terrorism" risks undermining the absolute prohibition on forced
return to torture or cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment. The case of Maher Arar, for example, raises issues of
grave concern. U.S. immigration authorities took him into custody
in September 2002, apparently based on unverified information
that he was involved in terrorism. He was arrested without a visa
at John F. Kennedy Airport in New York. Arar was attempting to
return to his home in Montreal from a flight that had originated in
73. See Rohde, supra note 23, at A14.
74. The right to timely repatriation of POWs, unprivileged combatants, and interned
civilians is further developed in Part IV infra.
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Switzerland. 75  A dual Canadian-Syrian national, he was
interrogated and detained under strict conditions at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in New York before being
summarily expelled to Syria on October 10, 2002.76
Since his return to Syria, Arar was held without charge or
trial. Canada strenuously protested his expulsion from the United
States and even Syrian officials expressed surprise that he was not
permitted to return to Canada.77 It does not appear that Arar was
given an opportunity to seek relief under the Convention Against
Torture or the ICCPR or to seek refugee protection, even though
torture in Syria is widely practiced by the security forces against
78suspected political opponents.
Persons who are transferred as "enemy combatants" to
detention facilities operated by the United States or to
collaborating states, such as Jordan, are similarly deprived of any
opportunity to claim protection under the human rights bars to
refoulement. Since the captives are denied access by the press, by
human rights monitors, by counsel, and by family, it cannot be
reliably determined whether they were subjected to torture or to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. Recent
press reports, however, indicate that certain interrogation
techniques used by U.S. officials may violate the provisions of the
Convention Against Torture and the ICCPR.79  Indefinite
incommunicado detention itself may contravene human rights
norms because of the debilitating psychological effects.8°
The applicability of human rights protections to these captives
is a matter of vigorous debate. The position of the U.S.
75. Daniel J. Wakin, Tempers Flare After U.S. Sends a Canadian Citizen Back to Syria
on Terror Suspicions, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library,
Curnws File.
76. Id. His family retained a lawyer in Ottawa, who was not notified prior to Arar's
removal.
77. Id.
78. See U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2001,
107th Cong., 2nd Sess. at 2267-68 (2002). The United States has implemented its
obligations under Article 3 of the Torture Convention. Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act, Pub.L. 105-277, Div. G, Title XXII, §2242, 112 Stat. 2681-822 (1998). It
is possible, however, that Arar was denied a removal hearing due to special security-
related provisions of the immigration laws. Aliens and Nationality, 8 U.S.C. §1225(c)
(1999).
79. See Priest & Gellman, supra note 1.
80. According to press reports, twenty-five Guant~namo captives have attempted to
commit suicide. See Lewis, supra note 23.
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Administration appears to be that humanitarian law does not
forbid these transfers and that human rights treaties have no
application. The territorial scope of human rights treaties is a
contested issue and standards may be clarified in light of U.S.
practice in the "war against terrorism."8' Effective mechanisms to
assess U.S. compliance, however, appear to be unavailable.82
Some of the states transferring captives to U.S. custody are
not parties to major human rights treaties and, thus, cannot be
held to account for their own violations in depriving the captives
the opportunity to contest their transfer based on human rights
nonrefoulement principles. The United States appears indifferent
to its own treaty obligations not to render persons to states where
there are substantial grounds to fear that these persons will be
subjected to torture.
These transfers, especially of persons seized in territories
remote from a conventional battlefield, also raise important
procedural issues. The six persons irregularly rendered from
Bosnia-Herzegovina to Guantdinamo established that their rights
under human rights obligations incorporated into the Dayton
Peace Accords were violated.8 ' The European Court of Human
Rights held that Bulgaria violated Article 5(4) of the European
Convention when it detained and summarily expelled a stateless
Palestinian without providing him an opportunity to contest the
lawfulness of his expulsion. The Court held:
The Court reiterates that everyone who is deprived of his
liberty is entitled to a review of the lawfulness of his detention
by a court, regardless of the length of confinement. The
Convention requirement that an act of deprivation of liberty be
amenable to independent judicial scrutiny is of fundamental
81. See Theodor Meron, Extraterritoriality of Human Rights Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L
L. 78 (1995).
82. The United States did not ratify the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, which
permits individual communications. The United States did accept the mechanism for
interstate complaints under Article 42, but no complaints were filed. The U.S. Senate
complicated domestic litigation by attaching a declaration of non-self-execution to the
U.S. instrument of ratification of the ICCPR. The extraterritorial location of the captives
also raises questions whether they are protected by the ICCPR. These factors are not true
legal barriers, but they diminish the certainty of litigation success.
83. Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina, Human Rights Chamber
Delivers 3 Decisions on Admissibility and Merits, Press Release, Oct. 11, 2002 at
http://www.hrc.ba/english/press-eng/pressEng/october02.pdf (last visited Sept. 21, 2003);
Boudella v. Bosnia, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia Herzegovina, CH/02/8679,
CH/02/8689, CH/02/8690 and CH/02/8691, 323 (Oct. 11, 2002).
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importance.., to provide safeguards against arbitrariness.
What is at stake is both the protection of the physical liberty of
individuals as well as their personal security.
National authorities cannot do away with effective control of
lawfulness of detention by the domestic courts whenever they
choose to assert that national security and terrorism are
involved .... A
Article 13 of the ICCPR states that persons facing expulsion
must be given an opportunity to present reasons why they should
not be expelled. This provision, however, includes an exception
for cases in which "compelling reasons of national security"
require expulsion without an opportunity to contest the grounds.
Thus, the risk that an individual may be subjected to torture or
other serious human rights violations will not categorically
guarantee procedural fairness in expulsion under the ICCPR.
Suspected terrorists are most likely to encounter Article 13's
limitation for security threats. Article 7 of the ICCPR, however,
imposes a substantive nonrefoulement bar to torture or cruel
treatment that operates independently of Article 13.
IV. HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE TRANSFER OF CAPTIVES IN THE
"WAR AGAINST TERRORISM"
The extraordinary practices of the United States in the "war
against terrorism" are claimed by the U.S. Administration to be
justified as necessary and proper in a new type of international
armed conflict between states and nonstate transnational terrorist
groups. Due to the fact that such conflict is not cognizable under
international humanitarian law, few clear rules exist concerning
the seizure, transfer, and detention of the 3,000 captives currently
held under U.S. authority. The "war" is conceived by the U.S.
Administration as being worldwide, of indefinite duration, and
against an enemy of unclear and variable definition.8 This section
will explore norms concerning internment and transfer of
prisoners of war, unprivileged combatants, civilians, and probe
their applicability to these captives.
84. AI-Nashif v. Bulgaria, Eur. Ct. H.R. App. No. 50963/99 $ 92, 94 (2002).
85. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, supra note 28, at 5.
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A. Internment and Interstate Transfer of Prisoners of War
President Bush denied prisoner of war (POW) status to all
captives held in the "war against terrorism," whether they were
members of the Taliban armed forces in Afghanistan, suspected Al
Qaeda fighters, or persons seized outside of Afghanistan. s6 This
policy is highly controversial and the denial of hearings by
competent tribunals to determine if these captives meet the
definition of POWs under the Third Geneva Convention received
87severe criticism.
Assuming that some of the captives are POWs by definition,
especially those seized during the internationalized internal armed
conflict in Afghanistan, it is necessary to examine the
humanitarian law rules relating to the internment and transfer of
such. Several issues become relevant such as the availability of
judicial supervision over internment, duration of internment, the
right to repatriate at the cessation of active hostilities, and
interstate transfer of POWs.
The U.S. Administration argues that humanitarian law does
not make provision for judicial supervision of the internment of
"enemy combatants." '  This is only partially true and not
convincing in the context of current internment and transfer
policies. POWs, who are granted full POW privileges under the
Third Geneva Convention during the course of active hostilities in
a genuine international armed conflict, do not have any rights
under that Convention to challenge the lawfulness or necessity of
their internment in a judicial or administrative forum. 9 None of
the current 3,000 captives, however, was granted POW status.
Moreover, some were seized in circumstances that cast doubt on
86. White House Fact Sheet, supra note 18.
87. Aldrich, supra note 21, at 892-96; Naqvi, supra note 11, at 572-73; see generally
Robert K. Goldman and Brian D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities
in Afghanistan: Their Status and Rights Under International Humanitarian and Human
Rights Law, (Dec. 2002) (paper for the American Society of International Law Task Force
on Terrorism), available at http://www.asil.org/taskforce/goldman.pdf (last visited Sept.
21, 2003).
88. This issue of lack of judicial supervision is argued in pending cases involving two
U.S. citizens in indefinite incommunicado detention in the United States, as well as in
pending litigation on behalf of various Guantgnamo captives.
89. See In re Territo, 158 F.2d 142, 148 (9th Cir. 1946) (denying a writ of habeas
corpus to a POW transferred from Italy to the United States, who claimed to be a U.S.
citizen).
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whether they may be legally characterized as "combatants" under
humanitarian law.
Where a person claiming to be a POW is interned, he is
entitled to a hearing before a competent tribunal to establish his
POW status pursuant to Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention. These hearings may be conducted by military
tribunals.9° The Administration denied Article 5 hearings to all of
the current captives. This policy marks a sharp departure from
U.S. practice in earlier conflicts, including the Gulf War and
Vietnam. If an alleged unprivileged combatant is tried for
conduct that would constitute a lawful act of war if committed by a
POW, he may raise a claim to POW status during his trial,
essentially claiming the combatant's privilege?
Under the Geneva Convention of 1929, POWs could be
interned until the conclusion of formal peace agreements.
Considerable concern was expressed in 1949 concerning the
lengthy internment of POWs following the end of hostilities in
World War 11. 93  Thus, Article 118 of the Third Geneva
Convention requires that POWs be "released and repatriated
without delay after the cessation of active hostilities." Even in a
conventional international armed conflict, however, determining
when hostilities have ceased can be quite difficult. 94 An even
greater challenge is posed in the "war against terrorism" because it
will never conclude if it lasts as long as a credible threat of
90. U.S. military regulations provide for a tribunal of three commissioned officers.
Naqvi, supra note 11, at 584-97.
91. Gasser, supra note 10, at 567. During the Iraq war in 2003, status hearings were
held to distinguish Iraqi POWs from unprivileged combatants. U.S. Dep't of Defense
News Briefing - Secretary Rumsfeld and Gen. Myers, Friday, April 25, 2003, at
http://www.dod.gov/transcripts/2003/tr20030425-secdef0l26.html (last visited Sept. 21,
2003). U.S. soldiers were captured in the war in Iraq. The desire to ensure that U.S. POWs
are treated in a humane manner creates a strong incentive for U.S. compliance with the
Third Geneva Convention. Concern about the treatment of U.S. POWs in Vietnam
shaped U.S. behavior in that war. Aldrich, supra note 21, at 892-96. No U.S. prisoners,
however, were seized in the Afghan conflict. Gasser, supra note 10, at 567.
92. Protocol Additional I of 1977, art. 45(2).
93. ALAN ROSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR 486 (1976).
94. India's continued detention of Pakistani POWs following the liberation of
Bangladesh is an example of the ambiguity of this rule. See R.C. HINGORANI, PRISONERS
OF WAR 180-82 (2d ed. 1982). A detailed analysis of the application of Article 118 is
contained in CHRISTINE SHIELDS DELESSERT, RELEASE AND REPATRIATION OF
PRISONERS OF WAR AT THE END OF ACTIVE HOSTILITIES: A STUDY OF ARTICLE 118,
PARAGRAPH 1 OF THE THIRD GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT
OF PRISONERS OF WAR (1977).
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international terrorism persists. Peace negotiations or a formal
armistice with nonstate groups and individuals who comprise the
"enemy" are virtually inconceivable, and no one anticipates the
rapid and permanent eradication of international terrorism.
Generally, the right of a POW to repatriate arises when active
hostilities cease. Repatriation, however, can be delayed for POWs
properly convicted of war crimes or other crimes. For the captives
in the "war against terrorism" who are eligible for protection
under the Third Geneva Convention as POWs seized in an
international armed conflict in Afghanistan, the right to repatriate
should be assessed when active hostilities in the Afghan war cease.
To hold POWs until victory is secured in the worldwide "war
against terrorism" would violate POW rights under Article 118 of
the Third Geneva Convention. The United States should only be
permitted to intern POWs beyond the end of active hostility in
Afghanistan, if these POWs are charged and tried for war crimes
or other crimes.
The legality of interstate transfers of POWs is assessed under
Article 12 of the Third Geneva Convention. Such transfers are
permitted only to states that are parties to the Third Geneva
Convention and that will fully protect the rights of such POWs.
Where it appears that POW privileges will be denied, the original
Detaining Power is under an obligation to take custody back and
to transfer the POWs to a place of internment where their rights
will be respected.
For example, during World War II, many POWs were
transferred out of combat zones to internment in Allied States and
were put to work in agriculture and other economic activities. So
long as POW privileges are respected, including repatriation at the
conclusion of active hostilities, such interstate transfers are lawful
under contemporary rules of humanitarian law. No judicial
supervision of such transfers is required. World War II also
involved clearly illegal interstate transfers, such as the notorious
"death marches" of POWs by Axis States.95 Current practice does
not involve conduct of such extreme illegality and inhumanity.96
95. A.J. BARKER, PRISONERS OF WAR 44-58 (1975).
96. A large number of prisoners held by forces of Northern Alliance warlord Abdul
Rashid Dostum in Afghanistan were reportedly killed during inhumane intrastate
transfers in shipping containers in late 2001.
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The United States is the Detaining Power at both ends of the
spectrum for most transferred captives from the Afghan conflict,
so it is difficult to apply humanitarian law. Coalition forces in
Afghanistan, however, appear to shape their behavior to avoid
violations of Article 12 by declining to transfer potential POWs to
U.S. custody.97
B. Internment and Interstate Transfer of Unprivileged Combatants
The defined rights of unprivileged combatants under
humanitarian law are more limited than the rights of POWs.
Commentary on the "war against terrorism" tends to focus on
denial of POW status, failure to provide Article 5 status hearings,
and the prospect of unfair trial and death sentences for those tried
by the proposed ad hoc military commissions." Little if any
attention is paid to irregular rendition of terrorist suspects or to
interstate transfers of persons labeled unlawful combatants.
Article 75 of the Protocol Additional I of 1977 provides a
basic set of rights for unprivileged combatants in international
armed conflict. In particular, Article 75(3) guarantees that
interned unprivileged combatants shall be released and repatriated
"with the minimum delay possible and in any event as soon as the
circumstances justifying the arrest, detention or internment have
ceased to exist." This language is not identical to Article 118 of
the Third Geneva Convention. Therefore, it is not clear whether
Article 75 authorizes internment beyond the duration of active
hostilities.99 Moreover, it does not exylicitly address the interstate
transfer of unprivileged combatants.'
97. Once the United States began transferring captives from the Afghan conflict to
Guant~namo and concerns were raised about denial of rights under the Third Geneva
Convention, other foreign forces in Afghanistan reportedly began to decline transferring
captured combatants to U.S. custody, in order to prevent violations of Articles 5 and 12 of
the Third Geneva Convention. Carlotta Gall, British to Hand Captives to Afghan Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
98. See, e.g., Agora: Military Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 320 (2002); Aldrich,
supra note 21, at 892-96; Gasser. supra note 10, at 567; Goldman & Tittemore, supra note
87; Naqvi, supra note 11, at 572-73.
99. In a cryptic statement, an editorial in the INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED
CROSS suggested in September 2002 that "[t]he status of a captured person has far more
than theoretical implications: in particular, conditions of internment, the length of
detention and the question of repatriation depend upon it." Editorial, 84 INT'L REV. RED
CROSS 518 (2002) (emphasis added). One difference between POWs and unprivileged
combatants is that the latter can be tried for the crime of engaging in acts of war that
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Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
provides a set of basic rights and obligations during internal armed
conflict, ensuring protection for insurgents and other unprivileged
combatants. Common Article 3 does not set limits on duration of
internment. Interstate transfer of captured combatants is not an
issue that generally arises during internal armed conflict and it is
not addressed in Common Article 3 or in Protocol Additional II of
1977.
The absence of legal authority suggests one of three things.
The first possibility, which the Bush Administration might argue, is
simply that no legal rules constrain the discretion of U.S.
authorities to seize persons any place in the world, to label them as
"enemy combatants" on the basis of suspicion of involvement in
terrorist activities, or to transport them thousands of miles away to
indefinite incommunicado detention. The second possibility is that
persons seized in situations that do not constitute a recognizable
international armed conflict should be protected by established
norms of extradition, refugee, and human rights law. To the
extent that any of the current captives are unprivileged combatants
seized during a cognizable international armed conflict, a third
option exists. This option urges that humanitarian law norms be
applied and that the duration of internment be linked to the
continuation of active hostilities, the same rule that applies to
POWs.
Unprivileged combatants may be prosecuted for engaging
unlawfully in acts of war or for common crimes. The frequently
cited Quirin case reflects this rule. Note, however, that the laws of
war applied in that case were superceded by more protective rules
in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Protocols Additional
of 1977."' The captives in the "war against terrorism" are
disadvantaged because they are held in indefinite detention,
without charge or trial before any tribunal, and are also denied
Article 5 status hearings. Thus, they are not able to establish their
status as POWs, as noncombatants protected by the Fourth
would be lawful if committed by a privileged combatant. Perhaps this is the import of the
ICRC's language in this editorial.
100. The United States has not ratified Protocol Additional I of 1977. Officials,
however, during the Reagan Administration indicated that Article 75 reflects binding
customary norms of humane treatment of unprivileged combatants. Goldman &
Tittemore, supra note 87, at 36-39.
101. Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1,12(1942).
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Geneva Convention, or as ordinary criminal suspects not subject
to wartime internment.
Where prosecution of unprivileged combatants is infeasible
during a genuine international armed conflict, these combatants
may be interned without POW privileges. Internment conditions
are partially addressed in Article 75 of the Protocol Additional I.
That provision, however, does not address interstate transfer
of unprivileged combatants. By analogy to Article 12 of the Third
Geneva Convention, one may assume that unprivileged
combatants should not be transferred to a state that will deny them
Article 75 protections, such as deliberate denial of medical care.
Violations of this principle were reported in press accounts.
10 2
The rationale for interning unprivileged combatants (who are
not charged or tried for any crime) is the same as that for
internment of POWs. Their internment is supposedly not punitive,
but preventive and designed to incapacitate them as combatants
for the duration of the conflict. Thus, unprivileged combatants
seized in the Afghan conflict should be released and repatriated
when active hostilities cease in Afghanistan.
To hold unprivileged combatants beyond that time is not
authorized by humanitarian law. Repatriation might be delayed
for POWs and unprivileged combatants charged and fairly tried
for a criminal offense. Such persons may be imprisoned for the
duration of their sentences.
To intern unprivileged combatants in the Afghan conflict for
the duration of the "war against terrorism" is to impose a form of
administrative detention not authorized by humanitarian law. The
United States has never administratively detained suspected
terrorists, unlike its ally, the United Kingdom.0 3 The current
practices regarding noncombatant captives violate human rights
norms, especially in relation to the denial of judicial remedies to
challenge the lawfulness of their detention. °4
Those captives who are not combatants should either be
protected under internment and transfer rules of humanitarian law
applicable to civilians or, depending on the circumstances of their
102. Priest & Gellman, supra note 1.
103. Memorandum, supra note 5. The United Kingdom filed notices of derogation
under the ICCPR and the European Convention when the 2001 Anti-terrorism legislation
was adopted by Parliament, recognizing the human rights implications.
104. General Comment, supra note 71, at 4-5; Report on Terrorism, supra note 71. The
United States has filed no notice of derogation under the ICCPR.
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seizure, be protected by ordinary rules of extradition, refugee, and
human rights law. Rules concerning interned civilians are
described Part IV.C infra, while rules applicable to suspected
terrorists not seized during international armed conflict are
described in Part III supra.
C. Internment, Transfer, Deportation, and Repatriation of Civilians
Powers may intern civilians under limited circumstances and
states engaged in international armed conflict may intern enemy
aliens present in their territory. Detailed rules concerning
conditions of internment, duration, transfer, and deportation of
civilians are contained in the Fourth Geneva Convention. These
norms are quite restrictive and require periodic proceedings to
assess the necessity of continued internment.1 5 Civilians may be
transferred out of combat zones solely for the purpose of insuring
their safety and they must be repatriated as soon as the danger
ceases, which may precede the conclusion of active hostilities for
the conflict as a whole.1°6  In light of Nazi atrocities, the
deportation or unlawful confinement of civilians who do not pose
a threat constitutes a grave breach and a crime against humanity. 1°7
The applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention to the
current captives is complicated by a number of factors. First, the
United States never became an Occupying Power in Afghanistan.
Second, there are no enemy aliens among the 3,000 captives in the
"war against terrorism" because the United States was not
engaged in international armed conflict with any other state."18
105. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 41, 42 (internment authorized only where
"absolutely necessary"), 43 (internment order must be reconsidered if civilian internee
requests, "as soon as possible by an appropriate court or administrative board" and
periodically "at least twice yearly"), 45 (transfer only to a Detaining Power that is a party
to the Convention), 78 (internment for "imperative reasons of safety"), 79-126 (detailed
rules on treatment of civilian internees), 127-28 (transfers of internees), 129-31 (death of
internees), 132-35 (repatriation of civilian internees).
106. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12,1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 127-128, 132-135.
107. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, arts. 49, 147; ICC Statute, supra note 53, arts. 7(1)(e),
7(2)(d); see Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Deportation and Transfer of Civilians in Time of War,
26 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 469, 470-72,485,518 (1993).
108. U.S. law restricts the definition of "alien enemies" to persons fourteen years of
age or older who are citizens or subjects of a foreign state with which the United States is
engaged in a declared war. Such persons may be interned, if they are located in the
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Third, whether any of the current captives is a noncombatant
civilian cannot be determined. Without status hearings under
Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention or prosecutions for
violations of the laws of war, it is impossible to determine whether
civilians are among those being interned.09
The United States does not acknowledge any of the current
3,000 captives as interned civilians and, instead, labels them all as
"enemy combatants." Those who were captured in situations that
do not amount to international armed conflict would not be
protected by the Fourth Geneva Convention. Their renditions are
governed by the norms of extradition, refugee, and human rights
law delineated in Part III supra.
V. CONCLUSION
In his State of the Union Address on January 28, 2003,
President Bush mentioned the 3,000 captives who are the subject
of this Article:
All told, more than 3,000 suspected terrorists have been
arrested in many countries. Many others have met a different
fate. Let's put it this way-they are no longer a problem to the
United States and our friends and allies.
We have the terrorists on the run. We're keeping them on the
run. One by one the terrorists are learning the meaning of
American justice.
There are several notable aspects to these remarks. First, the
terminology- "terrorists," "arrested," "American justice"-is
unusual for a President discussing the wartime internment of
captured combatants. This is the language of seizure and rendition
United States during the war. 50 U.S.C. §21. Internees, however, are entitled to seek a
writ of habeas corpus to challenge their categorization as alien enemies. United States ex
rel. Schwarzkopf v. Uhl, 137 F.2d 898, 900 (2d Cir. 1943) (ordering release of internee
upon proof that he was no longer a citizen of Germany and thus no longer met the
definition of an alien enemy in World War II). Even Iraqi nationals could not be interned
as alien enemies in the absence of a formal declaration of war.
109. During the Gulf War, a number of captured Iraqis were found in the course of
Article 5 hearings to be noncombatants, and were released from captivity and transferred
to camps for internally displaced persons or refugee camps. Goldman & Tittemore, supra
note 87, at 32.
110. Bush, supra note 11.
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of persons suspected of transnational crimes. Second, the
apparent reference to terrorist suspects who were summarily
executed (perhaps in targeted assassinations such as the one
carried out by an unmanned CIA drone in Yemen) is chilling."' It
suggests a disregard for the humanity and fundamental rights of
terrorist suspects that perhaps mirrors actual terrorists' attitudes
toward their perceived enemies in the West, but which is
antithetical to established human rights principles. Third, the
concept of "American justice" reflected in these remarks and in
the renditions and detentions of the 3,000 "war against terrorism"
captives is both new and alien. The current practices are
unprecedented and they conflict with legal values reflected in
established principles of extradition, refugee, and human rights
norms.
The threat posed by international terrorists is greater and
higher on the foreign policy agenda than it was prior to September
11, 2001. The internationalization of the Afghan conflict in
October 2001 also complicated the legal picture by plunging
counterterrorism into the midst of an international armed conflict
and implicating the rules of humanitarian law. But, the time has
now come to clarify the rules that should govern the seizure,
rendition, detention, and trial of suspected terrorists.
First, combatants captured in the Afghan conflict should be
given hearings pursuant to Article 5 of the Third Geneva
Convention as soon as possible. The Bush Administration
damaged its credibility by departing from the practices
implemented in the Gulf War and in Vietnam. Those who prove
to be POWs (regular Taliban soldiers) should be given their full
rights under the Third Geneva Convention, including Article 12 on
transfer and Article 118 on repatriation. The rectification of the
mistaken policy announced in February 2002 will reassure the
international community that the world's hegemon is committed to
preserving respect for international humanitarian law. Giving this
reassurance is imperative, as the United States battles another
international armed conflict in Iraq.
Those who prove to be unprivileged combatants-for
example, Al Qaeda fighters who engaged in combat in
111. James Risen and Marc Santora, Man Believed Slain in Yemen Tied by U.S. to
Buffalo Cell, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2002, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File.
One of the six men killed in the drone attack was a U.S. citizen. Id.
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Afghanistan-should be protected by Article 75 of Protocol
Additional I of 1977 as a matter of customary international law.
Thus, they should also be repatriated when the Afghan conflict
ceases and not interned indefinitely until international terrorism is
eradicated from the face of the earth. They should not be
transferred to states that will not respect their basic rights as
defined in Article 75. If their further incapacitation is required,
they should be charged with criminal offenses and given fair trials.
Alternatively, they could be subjected to administrative detention,
implemented consistently with the treaty obligations of the United
States under the ICCPR.
Those who prove to be noncombatants should be treated in
one of two ways. First, civilians captured in the Afghan conflict
should receive the full protections of the Fourth Geneva
Convention, including the rules relating to internment, transfer,
deportation, and repatriation of protected civilians. Second,
suspected terrorist seized in situations that do not amount to
international armed conflict (for example, in Bosnia and
Indonesia) should receive the full protection of extradition,
refugee, and human rights norms. If further detention is desired,
they must be charged with criminal offenses and granted fair trials
in ordinary courts or be subjected to administrative detention.
Administrative detention is not wartime internment. It is
governed, instead, by the provisions of the ICCPR, including the
derogation norms and the absolute prohibition of violation of
nonderogable rights.
112
112. See General Comment, supra note 71, at 4-5; Report on Terrorism, supra note 71.
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